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I.  INTRODUCTION 
In March of 2011, AT&T announced that it would buy T-Mobile USA.1  In 
                                                
*John Soma is a professor of law at the University of Denver Sturm College of Law.  Professor Soma is 
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August of that year, the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) filed a suit to stop the 
purchase.2  After four months of obstacles and setbacks, AT&T announced that it 
was withdrawing its bid.3  The DOJ had won this time.  The DOJ does not, 
however, always succeed when challenging high profile mergers.  In 2003, Oracle 
initiated its tender offer for PeopleSoft, and the DOJ filed suit to halt the purchase.4  
Oracle was not dissuaded, went to trial with the DOJ, and the DOJ lost.5 
As these two mergers indicate, the outcomes of cases concerning Section 7 
of the Clayton Act are no longer predictable.6  If the interpretation of Section 7 was 
predictable, AT&T would not have pursued T-Mobile, in which the deal fell apart 
                                                
also the Executive Director of the University of Denver Privacy Foundation. After completing his Ph.D. 
in Economics in 1975, Soma served from 1976 to 1979 as trial attorney for the U.S. Department of 
Justice, Antitrust Division, Washington, D.C., where he was primarily assigned to the Department of 
Justice trial team in the United States v. IBM litigation. In 1979, he joined the University of Denver 
Sturm College of Law faculty. In addition to seven books, Soma has authored more than forty 
professional articles in the antitrust and computer law area.  My thanks to Daniel Graham for his 
extensive help on this article.  All views, opinions, as well as any errors, are of course, the author’s.   
1 Paul Barbagallo, DOJ Moves to Block AT&T-T-Mobile Merger; AT&T Vows ‘Vigorous’ Court 
Fight on Issue, DAILY REP. EXECUTIVES (Sept. 1, 2011), http://www.dailyreport.bna.com/drpt/display/ 
batch_print_display.adp.  AT&T and other wireless phone companies have consistently complained that 
the wireless phone industry is suffering from a lack of spectrum (the airwaves upon which wireless 
phone signals travel), and AT&T claimed that this shortage was forcing it to purchase T-Mobile to 
acquire the spectrum it needs.  See Defendant’s Answer at 2, United States v. AT&T, Inc., (D.D.C., 
Dec. 20, 2011) (No. 11-CV-01560), 2011 WL 3966103; U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-
11-352, SPECTRUM MANAGEMENT: NTIA PLANNING AND PROCESSES NEED STRENGTHENING TO 
PROMOTE THE EFFICIENT USE OF SPECTRUM BY FEDERAL AGENCIES 35–36 (2011), available at 
http://www.gao.gov/assets/320/318264.pdf; Brian X. Chen, AT&T: We Need Spectrum or Prices Are 
Going Up, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 26, 2012), http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/01/26/att-fcc/ 
(“Smartphones and tablets are squeezing data networks.  And because of the limited amount of 
spectrum available to expand wireless services, the nation may face a data network shortage in the 
coming years.”); Gina Chon, Anton Troianovski & Anupreeta Das, AT&T Hunts Spectrum, WALL ST. J. 
(Feb. 16, 2012), 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204880404577225611179231968.html (discussing 
AT&T’s need to find a new source of spectrum after its deal with T-Mobile fell apart and as consumers’ 
demand for mobile data increases).   
2 Michael J. De La Merced, Jeffrey Cane & Ben Protess, U.S. Moves to Block AT&T Merger with 
T-Mobile, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 31, 2011), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/08/31/u-s-moves-to-block-
att-merger-with-t-mobile/ (describing the DOJ’s complaint, which contended that “AT&T’s elimination 
of T-Mobile as an independent, low-priced rival would remove a significant competitive force from the 
market.”). 
3 See Michael J. De La Merced, AT&T Ends $39 Billion Bid for T-Mobile, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 19, 
2011), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/12/19/att-withdraws-39-bid-for-t-mobile/. 
4 United States v. Oracle Corp., 331 F. Supp. 2d 1098, 1100–01 (N.D. Cal. 2004). 
5 Id. at 1175–76; see also Steve Lohr & Laurie J. Flynn, Judge Allows Oracle to Bid for 
PeopleSoft, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 10, 2004), http://www.nytimes.com/2004/09/10/technology/ 
10soft.html?pagewanted=all (“A federal judge ruled yesterday that Oracle, the nation’s second-largest 
software company, could proceed with its hostile bid for PeopleSoft, handing the Justice Department a 
rare defeat in a legal challenge to a corporate merger.”).  
6 15 U.S.C. § 7 (2012); see E. Thomas Sullivan & Robert B. Thompson, The Supreme Court and 
Private Law: The Vanishing Importance of Securities and Antitrust, 53 EMORY L.J. 1571, 1606–07 
(2004) (describing the shift in Supreme Court jurisprudence that occurred in General Dynamics and the 
resulting increased difficulty for the DOJ to win an antitrust case); see also United States v. Gen. 
Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486, 510–11 (1974); United States v. Von’s Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270, 301 
(1966) (Stewart, J., dissenting) (“In a single sentence and an omnibus footnote at the close of its 
opinion, the Court pronounces its work consistent with the line of our decisions under [Section] 7 since 
the passage of the 1950 amendment.  The sole consistency that I can find is that in litigation under 
[Section] 7, the Government always wins.”). 
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and AT&T ended up losing a $4 billion breakup fee.7  Obviously it is too late for 
AT&T to avoid the mistakes it made as it attempted to buy T-Mobile.  There are 
lessons to be learned.  A comparison of AT&T’s unsuccessful purchase of T-
Mobile with Oracle’s successful purchase of PeopleSoft reveals the elements of a 
successful approach to large-scale mergers.  By comparing these two deals, legal 
counsel to companies that are pursuing, or are contemplating pursuing, a large-
scale acquisition can learn the current, successful elements to approach growth by 
acquisition.   
This article sets forth the lessons to be learned from the comparison of these 
two deals.  Part I sets out an explanation of Section 7 case law, and Part II 
describes the outcomes of the Oracle trial and the AT&T failed purchase.  Part III 
describes the lessons that can be learned from this comparison.  Based on these 
lessons, Part IV makes recommendations for companies seeking to grow and avoid 
an AT&T outcome.   
II.  SECTION 7 LAW 
1. The Statute 
The “ultimate question” in a Section 7 analysis is “whether the effect of the 
merger ‘may be substantially to lessen competition’ in the relevant market.”8  In 
order to make this determination, courts have to establish two foundational 
concepts relating to the merger.  Courts must first establish the relevant product 
market—what the parties are selling.9  Courts must also establish the relevant 
geographic market—where the parties are competing.10  After answering these 
fundamental questions, the courts can then consider whether the merger or 
acquisition will substantially lessen competition.  Courts do this by considering 
how much market share the combined firm will possesses11 and whether future 
competition in the industry is likely to decrease due to the merger.12 
                                                
7 See Jenna Wortham, AT&T In $6.7 Billion Loss on Failure of T-Mobile Deal, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 
26, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/27/technology/atts-net-loss-tied-to-t-mobile-merger-
fees.html (describing AT&T’s $4 billion breakup fee and other losses associated with its attempted 
purchase of T-Mobile). 
8 United States v. Phila. Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 362 (1963); see also 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2006) 
(“No person engaged in commerce or in any activity affecting commerce shall acquire, directly or 
indirectly, the whole or any part of the stock or other share capital and no person subject to the 
jurisdiction of the Federal Trade Commission shall acquire the whole or any part of the assets of 
another person engaged also in commerce or in any activity affecting commerce, where in any line of 
commerce or in any activity affecting commerce in any section of the country, the effect of such 
acquisition may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly.”). 
9 See, e.g., Phila. Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S. at 356 (defining the product market as the “relevant product 
or services market” in which the merging companies compete). 
10 See, e.g., Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 336–39 (1962). 
11 See, e.g., id. at 343–44. 
12 See, e.g., United States v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486, 497–98 (1974) (emphasizing the 
importance of a showing of “anticompetitive effects” in order for the government to establish a Section 
7 violation). 
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2. The Classic Cases 
A. Brown Shoe Company 
The first case that dealt with a Section 7 violation after the 1950 amendment 
was Brown Shoe Co. v. United States,13 in which two shoe companies—G.R. 
Kinney Company and Brown Shoe Company—sought to merge.14  The Court 
evaluated the merger based on two main factors: (1) the product market,15 and (2) 
the geographic market.16  After defining the product market and the geographic 
market, the Court determined what percentage of this market Brown and Kinney 
would control post merger.17  Based on this degree of market share, the Court 
determined that the merger “may tend to lessen competition substantially in the 
retail sale of men’s, women’s, and children’s shoes in the overwhelming majority” 
of towns where Brown and Kinney had shoe stores.18  The Court also indicated 
that “tendency toward concentration in the industry” was another factor that 
weighed in favor of blocking the Brown-Kinney merger.19  Given the shoe industry 
had a demonstrated trend toward concentration, the Court affirmed the lower 
court’s holding and found that the merger would substantially lessen competition 
in violation of Section 7 of the Clayton Act.20  
B. United States v. Philadelphia National Bank 
The Court’s next noteworthy Section 7 case was United States v. 
Philadelphia National Bank,21 which arose when Philadelphia National Bank 
sought to merge with Girard Trust Corn Exchange Bank (“Girard”).22  After the 
Comptroller of the Currency approved the merger, but before the banks moved 
forward to finalize the merger, the United States brought suit to stop the 
combination.23  In its analysis, the Court determined that the relevant product 
                                                
13 Brown Shoe Co., 370 U.S. at 311. 
14 Id. at 296.   
15 Id. at 335–36 (establishing the product market as men’s, women’s, and children’s shoes because 
this was the market within which the two companies actually competed). 
16 Id. at 336 (concluding that the relevant geographic market was comprised of towns with 
populations greater than 10,000, and their “immediate contiguous surrounding territory” where both 
Brown and Kinney had retail stores because this definition covered the area where the merging 
companies competed). 
17 Id. at 343–44 (stating that the combined shoe company would control over 57% of the woman’s 
shoe market in one city, and 5% of the market share over the entire geographic area).  The Court stated 
that even though 5% of a market share may not seem like a large share, it can be a damaging share 
when it is held by a large national chain.  Id. at 344–45. 
18 Id. at 346.  
19 Id. at 344–45 (“Other factors to be considered in evaluating the probable effects of a merger in 
the relevant market lend additional support to the District Court’s conclusion that this merger may 
substantially lessen competition.  One such factor is the history of tendency toward concentration in the 
industry.”).  
20 Id. at 346. 
21 United States v. Phila. Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963). 
22 Id. at 323.  
23 Id. at 330–34 (stating that the government alleged that the merger would result in concentration 
within the commercial banking industry and that concentration would have adverse effects on 
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market was commercial banking, including checking accounts, savings accounts, 
and loans.24  The Court next determined that the relevant geographic market was 
the four-county region including and surrounding Philadelphia.25  The appropriate 
test to apply in geographic market determination was “where, within the area of 
competitive overlap, the effect of the merger on competition will be direct and 
immediate.”26  Philadelphia National Bank and Girard only had branches in the 
four-county region around Philadelphia and because consumers sought nearby 
(convenient) banking options, the Court decided that this four-county region was 
the correct geographic market.27 
After making these two foundational determinations, the Court moved to 
assess the effect of the merger on competition.28  The Court added a new analytical 
twist to the Section 7 analysis established in Brown Shoe29 by establishing a 
presumption in favor of finding a Section 7 violation based on the percentage of 
market share enjoyed by the merged companies after the merger.30  The Court then 
decided that if the Philadelphia National Bank-Girard merger went through, the 
combined bank would control “at least 30% of the commercial banking business in 
the four-county Philadelphia metropolitan area.”31  The Court did not say at what 
percentage of control a company passed the threshold into the realm of the 
anticompetitive presumption, but the Court stated that 30% control was enough to 
trigger the presumption.32  After these two premier cases, there developed a strong 
trend of courts ruling in the government’s favor.33  Up until the outcome in United 
States v. General Dynamics Corp., it was hard for the government to lose a Section 
7 case.34   
                                                
competition).  
24 Id. at 356–57 (stating that “the cluster of products (various kinds of credit) and services (such as 
checking accounts and trust administration) denoted by the term ‘commercial banking,’ composes a 
distinct line of commerce.”) (citation omitted). 
25 Id. at 361.  
26 Id. at 357 (citing BETTY BOCK, MERGERS AND MARKETS 42 (1960)). 
27 Id. at 358–59.  
28 Id. at 362 (“Having determined the relevant market, we come to the ultimate question under 
[Section] 7: whether the effect of the merger ‘may be substantially to lessen competition’ in the relevant 
market.”). 
29 Id. at 362–63. 
30 Id. at 363 (“[W]e think that a merger which produces a firm controlling an undue percentage 
share of the relevant market, and results in a significant increase in the concentration of firms in that 
market is so inherently likely to lessen competition substantially that it must be enjoined in the absence 
of evidence clearly showing that the merger is not likely to have such anticompetitive effects.”). 
31 Id. at 364.  
32 Id.  
33 See Scott A. Sher, Closed but Not Forgotten: Government Review of Consummated Mergers 
Under Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 45 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 41, 51–52 (2004) (“[F]ollowing 1950, 
the Supreme Court interpreted the amended [S]ection 7 in such a manner that antitrust authorities were 
granted the power to challenge even the most incipient of concentrations.”). 
34 See id.; see also United States v. Von’s Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270, 301 (1966) (Stewart, J., 
dissenting) (“In a single sentence and an omnibus footnote at the close of its opinion, the Court 
pronounces its work consistent with the line of our decisions under [Section] 7 since the passage of the 
1950 amendment.  The sole consistency that I can find is that in litigation under [Section] 7, the 
Government always wins.”) (emphasis added).   
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C. General Dynamics 
After a long trend of winning their Section 7 appeals, the government lost in 
General Dynamics.35  In this case, the government challenged General Dynamics’s 
acquisition of a coal mining company, United Electric Coal Companies.36 
The government sought to prove its case in the same way it had won its 
previous cases—by showing evidence that the coal industry’s number of 
competitors was decreasing and the merger resulted in a greater market share for 
General Dynamics.37  In this case the Court, however, did not accept this 
reasoning.38  In contrast with prior cases where the Court had found this reasoning 
to be persuasive, here the Court upheld the District Court’s determination that the 
statistics relied upon by the government only indicated the nature of the past 
competitive nature of the industry and were not indicative of the future competitive 
nature of the industry.39  The acquired company, United Electric Coal Companies, 
had depleting coal resources and most of its production had already been allocated 
to long-term contracts, and thus, the Court held that the government’s evidence 
failed to show that the merger would have a future negative impact on 
competition.40 
3. The DOJ Merger Guidelines41 
In addition to case law, the Horizon Merger Guidelines (the “Guidelines”) 
have had a significant impact on the outcome of antitrust cases.42  The Guidelines 
are “intended to assist the business community and antitrust practitioners by 
increasing the transparency of the analytical process underlying the Agencies’ 
enforcement decisions.”43  The Guidelines describe how the DOJ and FTC (the 
“Agencies”) define the relevant product market.44  The Agencies evaluate whether 
two merging firms have products that compete with each other and whether there 
are substitutes for that product.45  By evaluating the competition between the 
                                                
35 United States v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486, 510–11 (1974). 
36 Id. at 488–89.  Note that, technically, the acquiring company had been Material Service 
Corporation.  Id.  However, by the time of this decision, Material Service Corporation had been bought 
by General Dynamics Corporation.  Id. at 489. 
37 See id. at 494, 496.  
38 Id. at 503–04; see also Paul Cowling, An Earthy Enigma: The Role of Localism in the Political, 
Cultural and Economic Dimensions of Media Ownership Regulation, 27 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 
257, 280–81 (2005) (describing the shift in General Dynamics Corp. as a shift away from politics 
toward functionality in the Court’s antitrust analysis). 
39 Gen. Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. at 503–04. 
40 Id. at 502–04.  
41 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES (2010), 
available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/hmg-2010.pdf.  The DOJ and the FTC jointly 
promulgated these Guidelines.  Id.  
42 See Amanda J. Parkison Hassid, An Oracle Without Foresight? Plaintiffs’ Arduous Burdens 
Under U.S. v. Oracle, 58 HASTINGS L.J. 891, 893–94 (2007) (“[T]he Guidelines have been a persuasive 
force since their enactment, and any radical departure from them constitutes a major policy shift.”). 
43 Id. at 1.  “The unifying theme of these Guidelines is that mergers should not be permitted to 
create, enhance, or entrench market power or to facilitate its exercise.”  Id. at 2. 
44 Id. at 8. 
45 Id.  
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merging companies’ competing products, the Agencies can start to determine 
whether the proposed merger will be beneficial or harmful for competition 
involving that product.  The Guidelines also discuss the geographic market.46  The 
purpose of this evaluation is to determine the geographic limits of the competition 
relating to the product market.47  Factors that affect the geographic market 
determination include transportation costs, language, regulation, and tariffs.48 
After discussing product market and geographic market, the Guidelines treat 
the topic of concentration in the market by various tools including the Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index (“HHI”).49  The Agencies’ Guidelines set thresholds of 
concentration at which market dominance is presumed.50  The Agencies’ 
Guidelines also state that the Agencies evaluate a merger based upon the change in 
the HHI that it produces.51  While these thresholds are not strictly adhered to, they 
do provide general guidance.52 
The Guidelines also indicate that the Agencies will look beyond product 
markets, geographic markets, and HHI numbers to consider other factors.53  
Notably, the Guidelines emphasize a proposed merger’s effect on innovation in the 
industry.54  This is an important consideration because there is the potential that a 
combination of two key players in an industry will remove the combined firm’s 
motivation to create new products and designs because the level of competition 
that it is facing has decreased with the removal of a strong competitor.  The 
Guidelines also emphasize that the Agencies have wide latitude to act to prevent 
mergers that will have anticompetitive effects.55  These Guidelines and classic 
cases make up the legal backdrop for both Oracle’s and AT&T’s recent attempts to 
grow, and they will help explain why Oracle succeeded and AT&T did not. 
                                                
46 Id. at 13. 
47 Id. (“The arena of competition affected by the merger may be geographically bounded if 
geography limits some customers’ willingness or ability to substitute to some products, or some 
suppliers’ willingness or ability to serve some customers.”).  
48 Id.  
49 Id. at 18–19. HHI is used to measure market concentration.  Id.  Under the index, market 
concentration numbers are calculated by squaring then summing all market participants’ market share 
percentages.  Id. at 18.  So the smaller the individual market shares of the market participants, the 
smaller the HHI.  Id. at 19.  Conversely, the larger the market share of a market participant, the larger 
the HHI.  See id. at 18–19; see also United States v. H&R Block, Inc., 833 F. Supp. 2d 36, 71–72 
(D.C.C. 2011) (providing an explanation and examples of HHI calculations). 
50 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 41, at 19  (indicating that a market is 
not concentrated when its HHI is below 1500, moderately concentrated when its HHI is between 1500 
and 2500, and highly concentrated when its HHI is above 2500). 
51 Id. (changes less than 100 “are unlikely to have adverse competitive effects,” changes of greater 
than 100 in a “moderately concentrated market” “raise significant competitive concerns and often 
warrant scrutiny,” while an increase of greater than 200 in a “highly concentrated market” “will be 
presumed to be likely to enhance market power.”).  
52 See id.  
53 Id. at 20–34. 
54 Id. at 23 (“Competition often spurs firms to innovate.”). 
55 See id. at 1 (“[The] Guidelines reflect the congressional intent that merger enforcement should 
interdict competitive problems in their incipiency and that certainty about anticompetitive effect is 
seldom possible and not required for a merger to be illegal.”). 
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III.  WINNERS AND LOSERS: ORACLE AND AT&T 
1. Oracle Bests the DOJ 
In United States v. Oracle, Oracle went to trial with the DOJ over its 
proposed purchase of PeopleSoft and won.56  Both Oracle and PeopleSoft 
produced software called “enterprise resource planning” software.57  In its 
complaint, the DOJ attempted to narrow the product market to a specific type of 
“enterprise resource planning” software characterized as high function software 
relating to both “human relations management” and “financial management 
systems.”58  In its complaint, the government argued that only Oracle, PeopleSoft, 
and one other company produced these two types of high function software.59  
Allowing Oracle and PeopleSoft to merge, therefore, would result in 
anticompetitive effects in this corner of the software market.60  The district court 
was not persuaded by the government’s narrow product market definition.61  It 
stated that it was not convinced that if the Oracle-PeopleSoft merger were allowed 
to go forward, consumers would have no option “but to submit to a small but 
significant non-transitory price increase by the merged entity.”62  Rather the court 
found that consumers would be able to choose from substitute products, thus 
eliminating or at least significantly limiting, the merged entity’s monopoly 
power.63  
With regard to the geographic market, the government attempted to have the 
court limit it to the United States.64  Arguably, the government urged this 
geographic market definition to make one of Oracle and PeopleSoft’s 
competitors—SAP—appear smaller.65  The court, however, found that the 
geographic market was the worldwide market because competition for this type of 
software was not limited to the United States.66  Rather, foreign-based companies 
and U.S.-based companies compete worldwide for business relating to this type of 
software.67  In regard to market concentration, the court had no applicable statistics 
to consider because the government had only provided statistics based on their 
                                                
56 United States v. Oracle Corp., 331 F. Supp. 2d 1098,1100–01 (N.D. Cal. 2004). 
57 Id. at 1101.  This type of software “integrates most of an entity’s data across all or most of the 
entity’s activities.”  Id.   
58 Id. at 1101–03.  
59 Id. at 1107. 
60 See id. 
61 Id. at 1131–32, 1158. 
62 Id. at 1132.  In its evaluation of the government’s product market definition, the court discussed 
at length the various witnesses that testified on the government’s behalf in an attempt to help 
substantiate the government’s product market definition.  Id. at 1131.  Unfortunately for the 
government, the court did not find many of these witnesses to be credible.  Id. at 1132.  
63 See id. at 1159–61 (citing outsourcing possibilities, mid-market vendors, and Microsoft ERP 
products as possible substitutes for the merged entity’s ERP product). 
64 Id. at 1161.  
65 Id. at 1162. 
66 Id. at 1164–65 (finding that although relationships are important in the sale of ERP, competition 
for this product is not limited to the United States, just like competition in other product markets that 
involve relationships is not limited to the United States).  
67 Id.  
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product market definition, which was not accepted by the court.68  The court also 
considered the anticompetitive effects of the proposed merger.69   
Lastly, the court considered Oracle’s increased efficiencies defense.70  Here, 
Oracle argued that the merger would allow it cost savings, and would allow it to 
pursue greater innovations because it would have a larger customer base and 
greater revenue.71  The court found these efficiencies arguments to be speculative 
and unsubstantiated.72  The court, however, found in favor of Oracle because the 
government had failed to carry its burden of showing that the proposed merger was 
likely to substantially “lessen competition in a relevant product and geographic 
market.”73   
This case struck two blows against the DOJ.74  First, the DOJ lost, and 
second, the court articulated a standard that calls for the government to show a 
“likely” substantial lessening of competition when proving a Section 7 violation.75  
This is not the standard that the government wants.  Its Guidelines highlight that 
that the language of Section 7 emphasizes possibilities and not certainties when it 
comes to proving a Section 7 violation.76  Before AT&T’s attempt to purchase T-
Mobile, Oracle was the last major antitrust showdown for the DOJ.   
 
2. AT&T Withdraws Its Bid 
Unlike Oracle, AT&T did not get the better of the DOJ.  AT&T announced 
its proposed purchase of T-Mobile in March of 2011.77  In August of that year, the 
DOJ filed suit to stop the merger.78  AT&T continued to push forward, but it met a 
back-breaking obstacle when the FCC appeared ready to stall the deal.  In order for 
the purchase to go forward, AT&T had to obtain FCC approval.79  In April of 
                                                
68 Id. at 1165.  
69 Id. at 1165–76.  Here, the court focused on the government’s evidence regarding (1) coordinated 
effects and (2) unilateral effects.  Id.  The court determined that the government had not proven either 
of these claims.  Id. at 1175. 
70 Id. at 1173–75; see also U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 41, at 29 
(describing the possibility that a merged entity will be able to achieve greater efficiencies due to its 
larger size and therefore provide better products, better service, and other benefits to consumers).   
71 Oracle, 331 F. Supp. 2d at 1173–74. 
72 Id. at 1175 (“The court finds Oracle’s evidence on the claimed cost-savings efficiency to be 
flawed and unverifiable.”). 
73 Id. at 1175–76. 
74 The DOJ decided not to make the situation even worse and chose not to appeal to the Ninth 
Circuit out of fear the District Court’s factual rulings would negatively impact any Ninth Circuit 
appealed decision.  See Press Release, Department of Justice, Justice Department Will Not Appeal 
Oracle Decision (Oct. 1, 2004).   
75 See Oracle, 331 F. Supp. 2d at 1175–76. 
76 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 41, at 1. 
77 Back to the Future for AT&T, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 21, 2011, 8:42 PM), 
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/03/21/back-to-the-future-for-att/ (describing AT&T’s bid to buy T-
Mobile). 
78 De La Merced, Cane & Protess, supra note 2 (describing the challenge by the DOJ to AT&T’s 
attempt to purchase T-Mobile because “AT&T’s elimination of T-Mobile as an independent, low-priced 
rival would remove a significant competitive force from the market.”). 
79 Jim Puzzanghera, FCC Allows AT&T to Withdraw Application to Purchase T-Mobile, L.A. 
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2011, AT&T filed its application with the FCC, seeking permission to merge with 
T-Mobile.80  AT&T encountered more push back from the FCC than it expected 
because, after learning that the FCC Chairman wanted to thoroughly review the 
proposed merger with a “rare, trial-like hearing,” AT&T withdrew its application 
for FCC approval.81  It seemed that AT&T wanted to focus on the opposition it 
was facing from the DOJ and then worry about the FCC after it won in court or 
was able to settle with the DOJ.82  Even though the FCC initially appeared like it 
was not going to let AT&T withdraw its application without prejudice, it 
eventually did allow AT&T to withdraw without prejudice.83  Despite being 
allowed to withdraw its application, this setback from the FCC was the beginning 
of the end for AT&T’s bid for T-Mobile. 
After the FCC setback, the DOJ argued that “without an F.C.C. application 
there was no [deal] for the government to oppose” because AT&T needed FCC 
approval to carry out its merger.84  The DOJ then wanted to withdraw its lawsuit 
until the FCC application was resubmitted and there actually was a deal to 
oppose.85  The judge agreed with the DOJ and scheduled a hearing for mid 
January, at which time AT&T had to inform the court and the DOJ if it planned to 
proceed with its deal in its current form, restructure it, or drop it completely.86  
Before that hearing came, AT&T had thrown in the towel.  By mid December, 
AT&T announced that it was giving up its purchase of T-Mobile.87  AT&T would 
not—at least at this point—be returning to its Ma Bell glory days.  
                                                
TIMES (Nov. 29, 2011, 2:46 PM), http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/technology/2011/11/att-t-mobile-
deal-acquisition-federal-communications-commission-.html. 
80 See Cecilia Kang, AT&T, T-Mobile File Merger Application; Q&A with James Cicconi, WASH. 
POST (Apr. 12, 2011, 11:14 AM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/post-tech/post/atandt-t-
mobile-file-merger-application-qanda-with-james-cicconi/2011/04/11/AFhzCTQD_blog.html (stating 
that AT&T filed its application with the DOJ on April 8, 2011 and planned to have its FCC application 
filed on April 21, 2011). 
81 See Greg Bensinger, AT&T Bickers with FCC on Merger Review, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 26, 2011), 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204452104577060400382853704.html (describing 
how the FCC at first resisted allowing AT&T to withdraw its application without prejudice). 
82 See Michael J. De La Merced, AT&T Spars With FCC Over Withdrawal of T-Mobile Deal, N.Y. 
TIMES (Nov. 25, 2011, 7:44 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/11/25/att-spars-with-f-c-c-over-
withdrawal-of-t-mobile-deal/?scp=1&sq=at&t%20fcc&st=cse. 
83 Puzzanghera, supra note 79 (stating that the withdrawal can occur without prejudice but that the 
FCC is going to release its report regarding the proposed merger, which finds that “the purchase was 
not in the public interest”).  The FCC will also share its findings with the DOJ and make its report 
available to the public.  Id.  Because the report does not look favorably upon the AT&T deal, AT&T 
understandably opposed its release.  Id. 
84 See Edward Wyatt, U.S. Judge Grants Delay in Challenge to AT&T Deal, N.Y. TIMES, (Dec. 12, 
2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/13/technology/judge-grants-delay-in-challenge-to-att-merger. 
html?partner=rss&emc=rss. 
85 Id.  
86 Id.  
87 Nicola Leske, AT&T Drops $39 Billion Bid to Buy T-Mobile USA, REUTERS (Dec. 19, 2011, 
6:34 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/12/19/us-att-t-mobile-idUSTRE7BI1YZ20111219; see 
also Wortham, supra note 7 (discussing the $4 billion breakup fee that AT&T owed to T-Mobile as a 
result of the deal’s failure). 
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IV.  LESSONS LEARNED FROM THESE TWO DEALS 
1. Objective Factors 
A. Market Share 
A company’s market share is an obvious consideration for antitrust 
regulators.  Antitrust law and regulations works to preserve competition,88 
therefore, a company that possesses a large market share and is seeking to grow 
even larger through an acquisition will obviously raise antitrust concerns.  Oracle’s 
market share was not nearly as large an obstacle to its purchase of PeopleSoft as 
AT&T’s was to its proposed purchase of T-Mobile.  The judge in Oracle made it 
clear that the expert witnesses for the government were not credible or 
persuasive.89  The government had attempted to narrowly define the product and 
geographic market which would result in Oracle controlling a larger percentage of 
the market.90  The court did not accept either of these characterizations.91  The 
government had provided market share statistics based only on the product and 
geographic market definitions that it had proposed and because the court did not 
accept these product and geographic market definitions, the court did not have 
market concentration statistics based on the market definitions that it had 
ultimately accepted.92   
In contrast, AT&T’s market share appeared to be fairly well understood.  
Numerous articles written about the proposed merger summed up the market share 
division in the mobile phone market by stating that if the deal went forward, the 
number of large mobile phone companies would decrease from four to three.93  
The DOJ’s complaint also argued that AT&T’s proposed purchase would 
excessively increase its market share, resulting in anticompetitive effects.  
Specifically, the complaint provided Herfindahl-Hirschman Index  (“HHI”) 
calculations that indicated that the merger would produce a presumptively 
anticompetitive market share in AT&T.94  In particular, the complaint alleged that 
if the merger was allowed to go ahead, the HHI for the industry on a national basis 
                                                
88 58 C.J.S. Monopolies § 7 (2012) (“[T]he purpose behind both state and federal antitrust law is to 
protect and promote competition for the benefit of consumers.”).  
89 United States v. Oracle Corp., 331 F. Supp. 2d 1098, 1158 (N.D. Cal. 2004).   
90 See id. at 1148, 1162–63.  The government’s expert calculated the post-merger HHI in the 
industry to be 5700—well above the Guidelines’ threshold for a presumption of anticompetitive effect.  
Id. at 1112, 1148. 
91 See id. at 1158, 1164.  
92 See id. at 1165 (“Not surprisingly, plaintiffs did not offer any market share data other than those 
of Elzina [an expert witness].”). 
93 See e.g., De La Merced, supra note 3 (“And the deal’s end leaves T-Mobile, the weakest of the 
four national operators, with an uncertain future.”); De La Merced, Cane & Protess, supra note 2 
(stating that the DOJ was arguing that the deal would harm competition by reducing the number of 
national carriers from four to three); Barbagallo, supra note 1 (“If regulators define the geographic 
market as national, the presumptive finding will be that a combined AT&T-T-Mobile would control a 
40 percent market share and reduce the number of competitors in the market from four to three.”).  
94 Second Amended Complaint at 11–12, United States v. AT&T, Inc., (D.D.C., Sep. 30, 2011) 
(No. 11-CV-01560), 2011 WL 4806971.  
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would be greater than 3,100 and increase by nearly 700.95  The complaint also 
reported the post-merger HHI in ninety-six of the country’s largest CMAs would 
top 2,500.96  In ninety-one of ninety-seven representative CMAs, the complaint 
argued that the HHI would increase by 200 and this “increase is presumed to be 
likely to enhance market power.”97  The complaint addressed separately the HHI 
for business and government contracts and reported that post merger the HHI in 
that market would be 3,400 or greater, showing an increase of at least 300.98  With 
these calculations, the DOJ was able to show how oligopolistic the wireless phone 
market is and would become with the consummation of the AT&T purchase of T-
Mobile – especially considering that AT&T is the second largest wireless carrier in 
the country and T-Mobile is the fourth largest.99  For a court, numbers like these 
would be very persuasive. 
In its answer to the DOJ’s complaint, AT&T admitted the HHI calculations, 
but AT&T stated that the HHI calculations are only one factor in a merger 
analysis. 100  AT&T also did not provide alternate HHI calculations of its own.  In 
its answer, AT&T tried to minimize the importance of HHI figures generally.101  
This latter statement by AT&T indicated that AT&T was aware that it was fighting 
an uphill battle in regard to market concentration.  By trying to take the emphasis 
off of HHI figures and market concentration, AT&T was revealing that it was 
aware that the market concentration numbers were a major obstacle.  AT&T’s 
market share fight differed drastically from Oracle’s.  Against Oracle, the 
government failed to persuade the court to accept its product market and 
geographic market definitions.  The court had no way to consider market share.  In 
contrast, AT&T’s market share and the concentration of the mobile phone industry 
were fairly well established and likely to persuade a court should the deal have 
gone to trial. 
The first lesson from this comparison is that the government has to win the 
battle over product market and geographic market definitions, and the defense has 
to prevent the court from accepting the government’s definitions.  This first stage 
is crucial because it will determine how the market share calculations are 
performed and market share remains a critical factor in a court’s Section 7 
analysis.  
B. Unilateral Effects 
The next critical factor in the court’s evaluation of a merger is potential 
unilateral effects.  Consideration of unilateral effects has not always been a 
prominent portion of merger analysis, but it has become a central element in recent 
                                                
95 Id. at 12.  
96 Id. at 11.  
97 Id. at 11–12.  
98 Id. at 12.  
99 Id. at 4–5.  
100 Defendant’s Answer, supra 1, at 14–15. 
101 Id. at 15 (“HHI analysis is only one factor in merger analysis, and . . . a complete analysis must 
take full account of competitive dynamics and efficiencies not captured by such simplistic 
calculations.”).  
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years.102  Unilateral effects analysis began its climb to prominence with its 
appearance in the 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines.103  In short, merger analysis 
that incorporates a consideration of unilateral effects evaluates whether the merged 
entity will be able to raise prices for its products without market dominance or 
coordinated efforts because other entities’ products, while similar to the merged 
entities’ products, are not feasible substitutes for the products of the merged entity.  
For example, the H&R Block court stopped a merger between H&R Block and 
TaxAct and based its ruling in part on the absence of substitute products for those 
offered by H&R Block and TaxAct and on the fact that the competitors of the two 
entities would not be likely to develop such substitutable products.104  Because of 
this, it was more likely that the merged entity would be able to raise its prices 
independent of its competitors’ actions and without coordinating its actions with 
others.   
In contrast, the Oracle court found that the government had failed to show a 
likelihood of anticompetitive unilateral effects.105  After a long discussion of 
unilateral effects analysis,106 the court found that the government had failed to 
show the first element of a unilateral effects argument—”plaintiffs have failed to 
prove that there are a significant number of customers (the ‘node’) who regard 
Oracle and PeopleSoft as their first and second choices.”107  Because the 
government had failed to show a sufficient degree of “localized competition” 
between Oracle and PeopleSoft, the court did not have to take its unilateral effects 
analysis any further and consider whether the merged entity would be able to raise 
prices and reduce production irrespective of its competitors’ actions.108  The 
divergent outcomes in these two important cases undoubtedly influenced the 
arguments relating to unilateral effects—or rather the lack of such arguments—
made in the AT&T suit.   
In the case of AT&T and T-Mobile, the DOJ did not make allegations 
relating to unilateral effects in its complaint.  Instead, the DOJ focused on market 
concentration.109  DOJ may have chosen this approach because they felt that their 
market concentration argument was strong enough to win by itself or because they 
                                                
102 See Scott A. Sher & Andrea Agathoklis Murino, Unilateral Effects in Technology Markets: 
Oracle, H&R Block, and What It All Means, 26 ANTITRUST 46, 46 (2012) (“Merger enforcement policy 
has not always acknowledged the theory of unilateral effects. . . . By the time a federal court decided 
Oracle in 2004, the theory of unilateral effects had become the mainstay of merger analysis at the FTC 
and DOJ.”).  
103 Id.; U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES § 2.2 
(1992), available at http://www.ftc.gov/bc/docs/horizmer.shtm (“A merger may diminish competition 
even if it does not lead to increased likelihood of successful coordinated interaction, because merging 
firms may find it profitable to alter their behavior unilaterally following the acquisition by elevating 
price and suppressing output.”).  
104 See United States v. H&R Block, Inc., 833 F. Supp. 2d 36, 81-89 (D.D.C. 2011) (finding that 
unilateral effects were likely as a result of the merger); Sher, supra note 102, at 48.  
105 United States v. Oracle, Corp., 331 F. Supp. 2d 1098, 1172–73 (N.D. Cal. 2004) (“In sum, the 
court finds that plaintiffs have failed to show an area of localized competition between Oracle and 
PeopleSoft.”).  
106 Id. at 1113–23. 
107 Id. at 1172. 
108 Id.  
109 Second Amended Complaint, supra note 94, at 11. 
208 BUSINESS, ENTREPRENEURSHIP & THE LAW Vol. VI: II 
 
did not think they had a strong unilateral effects argument to make.  DOJ likely did 
not have a strong unilateral effects argument to make because the merged AT&T 
and T-Mobile would have still faced stiff competition from Verizon and Sprint, 
both of whom offer substitutable products to those offered by AT&T.  Both offer 
similar plans and identical devices—i.e. the iPhone.  Therefore, it is unlikely that 
AT&T would have been able to raise prices after its proposed merger independent 
of the prices and products offered by its competitors.  Consequently, the DOJ did 
not raise the unilateral effects issue, but focused on the market concentration 
argument.110 
Even though the issue did not arise in AT&T’s attempted acquisition of T-
Mobile, the importance of unilateral effects analysis has not decreased.  
Companies seeking to merge must be ready to show that their merged entity will 
not be able to raise prices and reduce output independent of the actions of its 
competitors because its competitors will have substitute products that will force the 
merged entity to compete.  Counsel for companies contemplating a merger must 
continue to emphasize the importance of unilateral effects analysis and evaluate 
whether the merged entity would be able to operate more like H&R Block and 
TaxAct, or more like AT&T and T-Mobile, with Verizon and Sprint ready to 
supply substitute products. 
C. Regulated Industries Pose a Double Obstacle  
In its proposed purchase of PeopleSoft, Oracle faced one main adversary—
the DOJ.  In its proposed purchase of T-Mobile, AT&T faced two—the DOJ and 
the FCC.  Two adversaries are naturally worse than one.  The DOJ brought suit to 
stop AT&T’s purchase of T-Mobile.111  In all likelihood, AT&T foresaw 
opposition from the DOJ.112  Given the size of its market share and the nature of 
the mobile phone market, it is likely that AT&T expected DOJ opposition to arise 
after AT&T gave notice of its proposed merger, as required by the Hart-Scott-
Rodino Act.113 
                                                
110 Note that although the DOJ did not raise the unilateral effects argument in its complaint, Sprint 
raised it in its complaint.  See Plaintiff’s Complaint at 62, 64, 66, Sprint Nextel Corp. v. AT&T, Inc., 
(D.D.C. Sept. 6, 2011) (No. 1:11-cv-01600), 2011 WL 3891692 (making conclusory arguments that the 
post-merger AT&T would be able to unilaterally raise prices).   
111 De La Merced, Cane & Protess, supra note 2.  Note however that both the FTC and the DOJ 
have the authority to bring suit under Section 7 of the Clayton Act.  See 15 U.S.C. § 18a(f) (2006).  The 
two agencies work together to decide which agency will bring a particular action.  If one of the agencies 
hears of possible anticompetitive activity before the other, then it may ask for “clearance” from the 
other agency so that it can take action.  The other factor that influences which agency will take action is 
the industry in which the suspected anticompetitive activity is occurring.  Both agencies have areas of 
expertise and if a case arises in an agency’s area of expertise, it will probably be pursued by that 
agency.  Telephone Interview with Allen Freedman, Attorney with the Office of Policy & Coordination 
for the Bureau of Competition, Fed. Trade Comm’n (Dec. 2, 2011). 
112 However, AT&T claimed to have been blindsided by the DOJ’s suit.  See Anton Troianovski, 
Blindsided and Besieged, AT&T’s Lawyer Fights On, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 22, 2011), 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424053111903791504576584774123453618.html. 
113 Whenever a merger of this size is proposed, the participants must notify both the DOJ and FTC 
before they close the deal.  This way the participants do not have a chance to scramble the eggs before 
the merger can be reviewed.  See Antitrust Improvement Act of 1976, 15 U.S.C. § 18a (2006); AT&T, 
Inc., Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q) at 16 (May 6, 2011), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/732717/000119312511130267/d10q.htm (“On March 31, 2011 
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It is less likely that AT&T anticipated all the grief that it ended up receiving 
from the FCC.  In April 2011, AT&T filed its application seeking the agency’s 
approval for the deal.114  In late November 2011, the FCC indicated that it wanted 
to hold a hearing to review AT&T’s proposed purchase.115  At that point, AT&T 
requested to withdraw its application.116  The FCC decided to allow AT&T to 
withdraw its application without prejudice but also publicly released its report, 
which AT&T fought.117  The report “outlined the $39 billion deal’s shortcomings,” 
focusing on why the alleged benefits of the deal would not outweigh its costs.118  
The combination of the FCC’s release of its report and AT&T’s withdrawal of its 
application meant that the merger was not going to succeed.119 
The lesson from AT&T’s stand off with the FCC is that a larger merger is 
more difficult to accomplish in a regulated industry where the deal will have to win 
the blessing of not only the DOJ, but of a regulatory agency as well.  Appeasing a 
regulator like the FCC adds an extra burden to an acquisition.  AT&T had to divert 
time and resources from its fight with the DOJ to answer the FCC’s inquiries and 
demand for additional information.120  This additional opposition to the deal meant 
that AT&T’s resources were spread more thinly than if AT&T had only one 
agency to satisfy.  Second, there is safety in numbers and it was easier for the DOJ 
to strongly oppose the deal as long as the FCC was opposing it, and vice versa.  As 
it became apparent that AT&T was going to face double the opposition, it became 
twice as hard for it to justify to shareholders its fight for T-Mobile.  Fourth, once a 
second government body stated its opposition to the deal, negative public 
sentiment was reinforced and positive public sentiment was weakened.  For these 
reasons, the fact that AT&T had two opponents to its deal made it much more 
difficult for it to push its deal through to completion. 
In contrast, Oracle only had one main adversary with which to deal.  This 
allowed Oracle to focus its resources on its fight with the DOJ.  Furthermore, in its 
fight with Oracle, the DOJ did not have a partner against whom it could lean.  DOJ 
                                                
we filed with the U.S. Department of Justice notice of the transaction [the purchase of T-Mobile] as 
required under the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act.”). 
114 Quarterly Report, supra note 113, at 16 
115 Amy Schatz & Greg Bensinger, FCC Blasts AT&T Deal, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 30, 2011), 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204449804577068562250634398.html; see also 
Anton Troianovski, Greg Bensinger & Amy Schatz, AT&T’s T-Mobile Deal Teeters, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 
25, 2011), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204452104577057482069627186.html 
(describing the hearing that the FCC was seeking as “rare”).   
116  Schatz & Bensinger, supra note 115. 
117 Id. (“[T]he staff report . . . gives chapter and verse on the agency’s contention that the deal isn’t 
in the public interest.”). 
118 F.C.C. Report Details Merger Shortcomings, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 29, 2011), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/30/business/media/fcc-report-on-att-deal-details-merger-
shortcomings.html. 
119 See Cecilia Kang, AT&T and T-Mobile Pull FCC Merger Application, Shift Focus to Justice 
Dept. Case, WASH. POST (Nov. 24, 2011), http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/atandt-
and-t-mobile-pull-fcc-merger-application-shift-focus-to-justice-dept-
case/2011/11/24/gIQAs8QytN_story.html (stating that the FCC opposition to the deal created a “major 
regulatory hurdle that all but ended the chances for a wireless mega-merger in the near term.”).  
120 See Amy Schatz, FCC Asks AT&T for More Info on LTE, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 25, 2011), 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424053111904787404576528613428221284.html (describing a 
request by the FCC for more information regarding AT&T’s proposed purchase of T-Mobile). 
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did not have the benefit of FCC opposition to help stir up negative consumer 
sentiment.  A large company that is seeking to grow by acquisition in a regulated 
industry therefore faces the additional burden of multiple heavyweight opponents.  
Large scale growth by acquisition will be less likely to succeed when a company 
has to appease not only the DOJ but a regulator as well.  
D. Industry Trends and Their Effect on Attempts to Grow by Large-
Scale Acquisition 
The Court also considers the trend of concentration in an industry when 
determining whether a proposed acquisition will violate Section 7.121  A district 
court will not disregard the trend surrounding market share numbers, but rather 
may find against a company with a low market share if that company’s industry is 
experiencing a trend of concentration.  This factor also cut against AT&T.  The 
telecommunications industry is a prime example of consolidation and 
concentration.122  AT&T itself has played a large role in this concentration.123  
Under Von’s Grocery, a court will find this industry trend toward concentration to 
be a strike against a company seeking to acquire and grow in that industry. 
In contrast, Oracle found itself in an industry with significantly less 
concentration than the telecommunications industry.  To begin, the computer 
software industry is much younger than the telecommunications industry and has 
had less of an opportunity to develop a history of concentration.124  During its 
early years, the high demand for software and software innovation allowed for 
entry into the market of many different software producers, and thus industry 
consolidation was not an issue.  Lastly, entry into the software market is arguably 
easier than entry into the mobile phone industry.125  The software industry will 
                                                
121 United States v. Von’s Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270, 275–77 (1966) (“[T]he basic purpose of the 
1950 Celler-Kefauver Act was to prevent economic concentration in the American economy by keeping 
a large number of small competitors in business. . . . Thus, where concentration is gaining momentum 
in a market, we must be alert to carry out Congress’ intent to protect competition against ever-
increasing concentration through mergers.”). 
122 Barney Warf, Mergers and Acquisitions in the Telecommunications Industry, 34 GROWTH & 
CHANGE 321, 325 (2003) (arguing that in recent years, the telecommunications industry “witnessed an 
unprecedented number of mergers and acquisitions.”). 
123 From early in its history, AT&T has faced antitrust scrutiny from the DOJ.  Since the 1940s, the 
DOJ has periodically made allegations of monopolization against AT&T.  See United States v. Am. Tel. 
& Tel. Co., 552 F. Supp. 131, 135 (D.D.C. 1982).  The DOJ’s claims culminated in the 1980s when 
AT&T agreed to settle an ongoing suit by giving up its local telephone service providers in order to be 
able to keep its national, long distance service.  See id. at 141; Paul W. MacAvoy & Kenneth Robinson, 
Losing by Judicial Policymaking: The First Year of the AT&T Divestiture, 2 YALE J. ON REG. 225, 225 
(1985) (explaining that the DOJ  “filed suit under Section Two of the Sherman Act challenging 
American Telephone and Telegraph Company’s (AT&T) regulated monopoly. . . . AT&T formally 
divested its local Bell Operating Companies (BOCs), pursuant to a consent decree ending the 
government antitrust suit.”). 
124 Development of business software began in the 1950s.  Robert L. Glass, The First Business 
Application: A Significant Milestone in Software History, 48 COMMS. ACM 25, 25–26 (Mar. 2005).  
Larry Ellison did not found Oracle until 1976.  David Millstone & Guhan Subramanian, Oracle v. 
PeopleSoft: A Case Study, 12 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 1, 3 (2007).  In contrast, the telecommunications 
industry began prior to the 20th century and AT&T itself formed in 1885.  See Milestones in AT&T 
History, AT&T (2013), http://www.corp.att.com/history/milestones.html.  
125 The Oracle court considered ease of entry in its determination that Oracle’s merger with 
PeopleSoft would not lessen competition.  United States v. Oracle Corp., 331 F. Supp. 2d 1098, 1134–
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always have new companies forming and competing, lowering the level of 
concentration in the software industry and easing the concerns of the antitrust 
regulators.126  In contrast, entry into the mobile phone industry requires significant 
initial investment and appropriate regulatory licensing approval, and this will keep 
the number of new competitors low and the trend toward consolidation high. 
The lesson to take away is that a company operating within an industry with 
a trend toward consolidation will have a more difficult time gaining the approval 
of the DOJ and antitrust regulators.  A company that wants or needs to grow must 
consider all the factors stacked against it before deciding to proceed with major 
acquisitions.  It is very likely that a company like AT&T would be better advised 
to pursue growth by a method other than major acquisitions.   
 
2. Subjective Factors 
A. Risk Versus Reward: What Did Oracle Have to Lose?   
Oracle’s decision to buy PeopleSoft was reactionary.  It made this decision 
after PeopleSoft announced a merger with J.D. Edwards.127  It is arguable then that 
Oracle did not want PeopleSoft so much as it did not want anyone else to have 
them.  Oracle had succeeded for a long time by growing on its own and making 
small acquisitions.128  So Oracle made a move for PeopleSoft to prevent its merger 
with J.D. Edwards.  It was a win-win situation for Oracle.  If its bid for PeopleSoft 
was successful, it would be able to grow and gain more market share; if its bid was 
not successful, then its attempt would likely inhibit J.D. Edwards merger with 
PeopleSoft. 
In contrast, no other suitor was courting T-Mobile when AT&T announced 
its desire to purchase it.  AT&T’s motivation was neither reactionary nor 
preventative.  Rather, AT&T wanted to buy T-Mobile mainly because it wanted to 
acquire T-Mobile’s spectrum.129  Its move was proactive.  All major mobile 
                                                
36 (N.D. Cal. 2004).  The court determined that other companies such as Microsoft would be able to 
fairly easily enter the software market occupied by Oracle, PeopleSoft, and their main competitors.  Id. 
at 1135.  Thus the court in Oracle did not consider the barriers to entry to this market to be significant.  
This compares with the more difficult entry into the wireless telecommunications industry which results 
from the scarcity and high price of spectrum.  See Chen, supra note 1 (stating that AT&T has argued 
that spectrum is in short supply and government regulators are not adequately meeting the demand).  
But see Holman W. Jenkins, Jr., How AT&T Miscalculated, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 21, 2011), 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204791104577110393277495270.html (arguing that 
“the [spectrum] shortage is grossly overplayed.”). 
126 In fact, for most of its history Oracle had grown from within, without needing to acquire other 
companies in order to get larger.  See Millstone & Subramanian, supra note 124, at 3–4 (“Over its first 
two decades, the company had so much organic growth—doubling in size in some years—that 
acquisitions were at best an afterthought.  Within Oracle the conventional wisdom was that integrations 
required too much management attention when so much growth could be achieved just by executing 
well.”). 
127 Id. at 1–2. 
128 See supra text accompanying note 124.  
129 See De La Merced, supra note 3 (“The company [AT&T] wanted T-Mobile’s cellular airwaves, 
or spectrum, to relieve its congested network and offer faster service for data-hungry devices like the 
iPhone.”). 
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telecommunications companies have identified the shortage of spectrum as a 
problem, and given that these companies vigorously maneuver to acquire spectrum 
and to keep their competitors from acquiring it,130 it is possible that AT&T thought 
that acquiring T-Mobile was worth a try.  If AT&T succeeded in its bid, then it 
would have acquired the spectrum it desired.  If AT&T failed, then it would have 
made a competitor’s acquisition of T-Mobile or another small wireless carrier 
much more difficult.  However, AT&T risked more in its bid for T-Mobile than 
Oracle risked in its pursuit of PeopleSoft—$4 billion more.131  After the deal fell 
apart, AT&T owed T-Mobile a hefty $4 billion breakup fee.  Part of this fee was 
comprised of spectrum that AT&T had to turn over to T-Mobile.132  The total 
breakup fee was one of the biggest in corporate history.133 
The lesson here is obvious, but apparently worth articulating, because the 
executives at AT&T missed it.  A company has to weigh what it is risking against 
what it stands to gain when pursuing a large-scale merger.  Both AT&T and Oracle 
risked time and resources by pursuing a merger, but unlike AT&T, Oracle did not 
have $4 billion on the line.  When attempting a large merger, a company needs to 
cautiously consider what it is risking so that it does not find itself owing a large 
breakup fee and having to turn over valuable resources like spectrum as a part of 
that fee.   
B. Good Luck and Bad Luck: The Vagaries of Litigation  
Twists of fate can help push a deal forward or can stop it in its tracks, and no 
matter how intelligent or talented the leaders at Oracle or AT&T are, they are not 
immune from misfortune.  AT&T had its share of misfortune, which contributed to 
the failure of its bid for T-Mobile.  There was a leaked document.  In August of 
2011, AT&T lawyers accidently released an unredacted copy of a letter to the 
FCC.134  The letter explained that AT&T could accomplish its extension of its 
network into rural communities—one of its purported main reasons for its 
acquisition of T-Mobile—at about one tenth of the price that it was willing to pay 
for T-Mobile.135  This revealing fact made regulators question AT&T’s motives.136  
Creating this distrust of its motivations hindered AT&T’s pursuit of T-Mobile.  
Second, the presidential election cycle did not help AT&T as much as it 
could have.  It was no coincidence that AT&T chose to pursue this acquisition with 
a presidential election on the horizon.137  AT&T sought to use this upcoming 
                                                
130 See, e.g., Lucas Shaw, T-Mobile Asks FCC to Block Verizon’s Spectrum Deals with Comcast, 
Time Warner, REUTERS (Feb. 22, 2012, 3:05 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/02/ 
22/idUS104885420720120222 (describing T-Mobile’s opposition to Verizon’s bid to buy spectrum). 
131 See Wortham, supra note 7 describing AT&T’s 4 billion dollar breakup fee). 
132 Greg Bensinger, FCC Approves Transfer of AT&T Breakup Fee Airwaves to T-Mobile, WALL 
ST. J., Apr. 25, 2012, at B8, (discussing the $1 billion worth of spectrum that AT&T paid to T-Mobile 
as part of its breakup fee).   
133 Id. (“The breakup fee is among the largest in corporate history, in terms of size and percentage, 
according to Dealogic.”).   
134 Schatz, supra note 120. 
135 Id.  
136 See id.  
137 See Lucas Shaw, AT&T’s T-Mobile Deal: Could the Election Tip the Scales Again?, REUTERS 
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election to its advantage, and force the presidential administration to favor it—by 
highlighting the American jobs that would be created by the deal.138  With this 
rhetoric, AT&T tried to gain favor for its deal and push it through during an 
election year when President Barack Obama was undoubtedly concerned about 
how the White House was perceived by the American business community.  
AT&T’s job-creation projections, however, were questioned and called into doubt 
when AT&T provided unsatisfactory answers.139  As a result, the FCC came to 
believe that the deal would actually cause a loss of American jobs.140 
Unfortunately AT&T miscalculated President Obama’s administration’s 
response to its proposed purchase of T-Mobile.  Instead of kowtowing to the 
corporate giant during an election year due to insecurities about the American 
economy and unemployment rate, the Administration pushed back against the 
deal.141  As with the document it leaked to the FCC, this was probably bad luck for 
AT&T.  The lesson, then, is that fortune can play a role in the success or failure of 
a deal like this one.  Although it may not play a big role, the leaders of companies 
should expect bouts of bad luck as they pursue acquisitions, and they need to be 
ready to deal with these bouts.   
C. Media Coverage and Consumer Sentiment  
AT&T had more working against it than the government regulators.  In 
addition, media coverage and consumer sentiment worked against AT&T’s deal.142  
Not every proposed merger draws the focus of the American public or the media.  
The AT&T deal gained atypical, widespread media attention as well as attention 
from the general public.143  Not only was the business community watching the 
deal—cell phone users were too.  Undoubtedly the widespread media attention that 
the deal drew was due in part to most Americans’ familiarity with these companies 
and use of their products.  Not only do most people use cellular phones,144 but 
                                                
(Nov. 28, 2011, 1:18 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/11/28/idUS356503073020111128 
(describing how a Republican administration would help AT&T push its purchase forward). 
138 Michael J. De La Merced, AT&T Plans to Bring Back Jobs Sent Abroad, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 30, 
2011, 11:45 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/08/30/att-plans-to-bring-back-jobs-sent-abroad/; 
cf. Edward Wyatt & Jenna Wortham, AT&T Merger with T-Mobile Faces Setbacks, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 
25, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/25/technology/att-deal-with-t-mobile-takes-a-step-
back.html?bl (“F.C.C. officials have said that AT&T’s confidential filings indicate the merger would 
eliminate jobs.”). 
139 Edward Wyatt, F.C.C. Seeks Review of AT&T Merger with T-Mobile, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 22, 
2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/23/business/media/fcc-seeks-review-of-att-merger-with-t-
mobile.html?pagewanted=all. 
140 Id. 
141 See De La Merced, supra note 2 (referring to President Obama’s administration’s opposition to 
the deal as “stiff”).  
142 See Eleanor M. Fox, AT&T/T-Mobile: Will Consumer Intuition Prove Correct?, REUTERS 
(Sept. 2, 2011), http://blogs.reuters.com/mediafile/2011/09/02/attt-mobile-will-consumer-intuition-
prove-correct (“In the last 48 hours the media have reported consumer intuitions that this merger is 
seriously anticompetitive.”).  
143 Barry Goodstadt, Alan Pearce & Martyn Roetter, Forty Questions that Will Make or Break 
AT&T’s Acquisition of T-Mobile, DAILY REP. EXECUTIVES (Apr. 18, 2011), 
http://www.dailyreport.bna.com/drpt/display/batch_print_display.adp (stating that AT&T’s proposed 
acquisition was receiving a great deal of attention from regulators, the media, and the public). 
144 Id. (“Today there are more than 300 million wireless handsets in use in America, and more than 
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many people use AT&T and T-Mobile cellular phones.  This meant that many 
people felt connected to the merger and took an interest in it.  This fact led to 
considerable media coverage of AT&T’s bid to buy T-Mobile.  
If the coverage and the news had been positive, then that would have cut in 
favor of AT&T, but most of the news was negative.145  The resulting effect was 
that consumers’ opinions regarding the deal were often negative, which in turn led 
to additional negative media coverage.  A cycle of negative media coverage and 
negative consumer reaction began to weigh down AT&T’s proposed purchase.  In 
contrast, Oracle’s bid for PeopleSoft received substantially less media attention.  
This, no doubt, is a result of most people’s greater familiarity with AT&T and T-
Mobile.  Although many companies use Oracle and PeopleSoft products, these two 
entities do not have the brand name recognition of AT&T and T-Mobile.  There is 
less general interest in a story about a merger between these two entities because 
even though a merger would affect a large number of people—employees of 
companies who use either Oracle or PeopleSoft software—many people would not 
even be aware that this merger deal would affect them.  This means that companies 
like Oracle and PeopleSoft can worry less about media coverage and instead focus 
more on making their case to government regulators, not the American public.   
The lesson from this evaluation of the media coverage and consumer 
sentiment surrounding AT&T’s proposed purchase of T-Mobile is that when a 
large scale merger is going to affect a large number of consumers who are familiar 
with the companies involved, the deal will attract a good deal of media attention 
and public attention.  If that attention is positive, then that can help the deal move 
forward.  If the attention is negative, this negative reaction will impede the deal.  
Company leaders need to be ready to promote a positive public reception to these 
large-scale deals.  If a company can create a positive reception for its deal, the 
chances of success for the deal will increase.   
D. Emotion: AT&T’s Winning History May Have Clouded Its 
Judgment  
AT&T had faced DOJ antitrust complaints in the past.146  More importantly, 
AT&T had a history of winning these disputes with the DOJ and continuing to 
prosper and expand.147  Having this history of positive outcomes relating to DOJ 
antitrust litigation may have created a feeling of invincibility in AT&T.  The 
company’s leaders may have believed, incorrectly, that they had favorably settled 
these disputes in the past and they would be able to do so again.  Unfortunately for 
AT&T, this time they did not reach a favorable settlement with the DOJ.  Rather, 
                                                
5 billion throughout the rest of the world.”). 
145 See, e.g., Ian Shapira & Jia Lynn Yang, AT&T, T-Mobile Merger Blasted, WASH. POST (Mar. 
21, 2011), http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/atandt-t-mobile-merger-blasted/2011/03/ 
21/ABHs3Y9_story.html (“A day after AT&T announced it would buy T-Mobile USA to create the 
biggest wireless carrier in the country, consumer advocates and some members of Congress blasted the 
deal, arguing the $39 billion merger would lead to higher prices and fewer choices for cellphone 
users.”). 
146 See supra text accompanying note 124.   
147 Id.; see also Warf, supra note 122, at 325–32 (describing AT&T’s multiple acquisitions of 
communications companies in the 1990s). 
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they abandoned their purchase and as a result owed a $4 billion breakup fee to T-
Mobile.148  AT&T’s past litigation success may have blinded them to the failure 
that awaited them on this deal. 
By contrast, Oracle did not have a winning history regarding battles with 
antitrust regulators.149  This fact quite possibly put Oracle in a better position than 
AT&T, when it came time to meet the DOJ’s antitrust allegations.  Oracle did not 
have a history of battling and persevering against the DOJ, and Oracle did not 
underestimate the DOJ.150  This in turn may have led Oracle to succeed against the 
DOJ where AT&T has now failed.  The lesson here is that a company needs to 
objectively view its chances for success for each individual deal it pursues.  When 
a company has a history of success in antitrust litigation it is possible for it to 
develop a feeling of invincibility.  This feeling may well cause it to overestimate 
its chances for success.  This in turn will cause it to waste resources—time, money, 
and talent—pursuing deals that are not likely to succeed.   
V.  HOW TO GROW IN THIS REGULATORY CLIMATE 
1. Make Smaller Acquisitions 
Large acquisitions—like the one AT&T just attempted—are costly.  Not 
only did AT&T have to pay out a $4 billion breakup fee to T-Mobile,151 it also lost 
time and other resources while pursuing this deal.  When companies attempt big 
acquisitions they spend key employee time and talent, and they also risk losing 
quality employees who do not want to wait around to find out if they will have a 
job post-merger or what their new role will be after the merger succeeds.152  A 
company needs to carefully weigh the total cost of attempting a merger or 
acquisition.   
An alternative to a large-scale merger that is more likely to succeed and have 
a lower overall cost is a series of small acquisitions.  A smaller purchase is less 
likely to draw the scrutiny of antitrust regulators due to the low market 
concentrations.  Any associated breakup fee will also likely be lower, thus easing 
the penalty if the deal fails to reach completion.  Third, the associated costs such as 
                                                
148 See Wortham, supra note 7 (discussing AT&T’s $4 billion breakup fee). 
149 See supra text accompanying note 125.  
150 Additionally, the personalities of the leaders at Oracle and AT&T, Larry Ellison and Wayne 
Watts respectively, may have been a factor in Oracle’s success and AT&T’s failure.  Larry Ellison is a 
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152 Kelley Holland, Life After a Merger: Learning on Both Sides, N.Y. TIMES (June 24, 2007), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/06/24/business/yourmoney/24mgmt.html (discussing the danger of 
losing key employees once a merger is proposed). 
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talent drain and time consumption will likely be lower due to: (1) employees will 
be less skittish regarding a small acquisition as opposed to a big acquisition or 
merger and (2) smaller deals will likely taken less time to complete.  
Oracle now appears to be operating under this model.  Soon after AT&T’s 
bid for T-Mobile fell apart, Oracle agreed to purchase a relatively small company 
called Taleo, which produces online-based software, for $1.9 billion.153  
Additionally, in the fall of 2011, Oracle announced its intent to purchase cloud-
computing company RightNow Technologies for $1.43 billion.154  Both of these 
acquisitions were relatively small.  Neither of them has drawn near the antitrust 
scrutiny that AT&T’s attempted purchase of T-Mobile did.  Additionally, the deals 
likely have not cost Oracle as much near the time and money as AT&T’s attempted 
purchase of T-Mobile cost it.  Lastly, the deal for RightNow Technologies has 
gone through and the deal for Taleo will likely go through as well, meaning that 
Oracle has avoided the risk of paying out a costly breakup fee.  
Juxtaposing AT&T’s attempted purchase of T-Mobile and Oracle’s recent 
purchases of these two smaller companies reveals that smaller is likely better.  A 
company wishing to grow can make multiple smaller acquisitions, as Oracle is 
doing, to achieve similar growth results.  A company employing this strategy risks 
less because each deal is more likely to succeed and will have lower resource and 
talent costs.   
2. Get Creative with Structure 
There are other ways to grow without running afoul of antitrust regulations.  
Many companies are avoiding the complications of mergers and acquisitions, and 
instead opting for joint ventures and combined marketing agreements.  A prime 
example is Verizon’s proposed plan to purchase spectrum from various cable 
companies.155  The deal calls for a joint-marketing agreement between Verizon and 
Comcast, wherein the two companies will promote each other’s products.156  Far 
from attempting to purchase a national mobile phone company like T-Mobile and 
thus further concentrating market share in the mobile telecommunications industry, 
Verizon is only buying what it wants—spectrum—from cable companies who are 
not even using it.157 
Admittedly, Verizon’s proposed purchase is drawing some antitrust 
attention.158  This deal is smaller however and involves mainly just the sale of an 
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asset and not the sale of a whole company, meaning it is more likely that this deal 
will succeed, providing Verizon with the asset it needs to maintain its position in 
the mobile telecommunications industry.  Examples of creative structure exist 
outside the telecommunications industry as well.  Comcast recently completed a 
joint venture with NBC Universal.  In January of 2011, Comcast received approval 
from the FCC and the DOJ to purchase 51% of NBC Universal.159  After a year of 
regulator review and a DOJ suit to stop the joint venture, Comcast and the DOJ 
reached a settlement that allowed the deal to go forward.160  Comcast agreed to 
certain restrictions that the DOJ imposed in order to maintain competition in the 
media industry.161  This Comcast success came despite the fact that both Comcast 
and NBC Universal are huge players in the media industry.162   
Although the media market is not identical to the mobile telecommunications 
market, Comcast’s successful deal with NBC Universal still provides a valuable 
comparison to AT&T’s attempt to buy T-Mobile.  The fact that two large 
companies were able to successfully see their deal through to completion while 
still getting what they wanted, and without having to withstand a drawn out 
antitrust trial, demonstrates that successful combinations can be done.  The lesson 
is that large companies like AT&T, T-Mobile, Comcast, and NBC Universal need 
to think creatively.  Antitrust regulators will more fervently resist a full-scale 
acquisition compared to a more limited combination such as a joint venture.  
Companies that want to combine forces need to be willing to consider alternatives 
to a full merger. 
VI.  CONCLUDING REMARKS 
AT&T’s failed attempt to buy T-Mobile provides valuable lessons for 
companies wanting to grow while avoiding Section 7 scrutiny.  The costs for large-
scale acquisitions are high, and they get even higher when the deals fall through 
and the would-be acquirer owes a large breakup fee.  In order to minimize these 
risks and still obtain the benefits that growth can provide, companies need to 
consider growing via a series of smaller acquisitions or structuring their 
combinations as joint ventures rather than as mergers.  Companies like Oracle, 
Verizon, and Comcast have already begun to employ these strategies that allow 
them to grow without wasting excessive time and money pursuing large-scale 
mergers that fail.   
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